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In this thesis, it is intended to examine the nature and 
development of Country Party organization in Queensland from approximately 
I936 when the party began to re-emerge after its demise in the 1920's until 
1944 when the Australian Country Party (Queensland) was formally inaugaur- 
ated.
Between these years, the environment that existed, the 
events that took place, and the rules that were laid down, would strongly 
influence both the organization and the party as a whole in future years.
The course of development of the organization was not 
always clear-cut. Instead, there were sometimes divergent forces. Some 
forces would even try to steer the organization into complete extinction. 
However, by 1944, a distinctive pattern of organizational structure and 
behaviour had emerged.
This emerging pattern will be examined under the headings 
of survival, general structure, membership, branches, finance, regional 
autonomy, selecting the candidates, and relationship with the pari¡amen­
tary wing. In conclusion, it is intended to summarize the trends and to 
briefly describe the impact of these developments upon the future of the 
organization and the party.
However, before commencing this task, it is necessary to 




HISTORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1936 - 1944
A Country Party had first appeared in Queensland in 1915. 
However, it failed to maintain a separate and independent existence.*
In 1916, the five 'Country Party1 members of parliament joined with the 
Liberal Party in a National Political Council. In 1919, a Primary 
Producers' Union was established to return 'Country Party' members to 
parliament. A parliamentary Country Party was formed in 1920, and 
twenty-one members were returned at the state elections held the foll­
owing year. However, in 1925, all Country Party members of parliament
effectively merged with the United Party to form the Country and Progress-
2
ive National Party (C.P.N.P.). This party still existed in 1936 when
one finds renewed efforts to establish an independent Country Party.
The resurgence of the Country Party movement in 1936
was due to many factors. Among the most important causes were rising costs,
the demand for orderly marketing schemes for primary products, and the
3
high tariff policies of the Lyons Government.
The driving force behind the movement was J.A.A. Hunter, 
the federal member for Maranoa (1921 - 1940). Country Party branches 
were formed at Roma, Stanthorpe, and Mackay in mid-1935* Branches 
also began to be re-formed or re-named Country Party in North Queensland. 
Some argument exists over whether a Country Party ever really disappeared 
in the north. It appears the Northern Country Party (N.C.P.) had 
merged with the United Party in 1925 to become the northern division of 
the C.P.N.P. However, the organizing secretary of the N.C.P., J.J.
McDonald, insists that the N.C.P. retained its name and identity through-
L
out the period 1925 to 1936. The important thing is that in 1936 the
northern body joined the movement for the re-establishment of a Country 
Party throughout the whole state.
To further this end, a conference of all these elements 
was convened at Toowoomba on March 4-5, 1936 and the Queensland Country 
Party (Q.C.P.) was formally inaugurated. John Leahy, a Stanthorpe 
grazier and one of the founders of the Stanthorpe branch, was elected 
president of the organization. The organizing secretary of the N.C.P.,
J.J. McDonald, was appointed chief organizer.
The rural members of theC.P.N.P.were now invited to join 
the new organization.“* At the time, there were thirteen 'country' members, 
most of whom came from the south-east corner of the state.^ On May 22, 
1936, they all decided to join the organization, leaving only three city 
members affiliated with the United Australia Party (U.A.P.).
One of the conditions set by the Q.C.P. executive for the 
entry of the parliamentarians was that A.E. Moore would have to resign 
as parliamentary leader of both the party and the opposition.^ Moore 
was widely seen as an electoral handicap. His period of office as the 
government, 1929 “ 32, had not been popular and had co-incided with the 
worst days of the Depression. Moore finally resigned on July 15, 1936 
and E.B. Maher (West Moreton) was unanimously elected as the new leader
o
of the Q.C.P.
On August 14-15, 1936, another conference of the Q.C.P. 
was held. The executive or central council was re-elected. A provis­
ional constitution, platform, and policy were discussed and adopted.
During the first twelve months, considerable enthusiasm 
was evident within the organization. However, many obstacles were en-




the N.C.P. enjoyed a degree of financial buoyancy at this time. Members
of parliament were often hostile to organizing in their own electorates.
Within central council itself, serious clashes developed over the debts
incurred by the organizing secretary, J.J. McDonald. To make matters worse,
these disagreements appeared to evolve into personal exchanges. On Sept-
q
ember 28, 1937, McDonald formally resigned as organizing secretary and 
returned to the north.
The organization's first major electoral contest was the 
1938 state elections. The results were extremely disappointing and morale 
declined. The party did not gain any new seats and in fact lost Godfrey 
Morgan's seat of Dal by.
At the 1938 annual conference (August 12-13), the constitu­
tion, platform, and policy of the party were revised, incorporating the 
many changes and amendments that had taken place since 1936.
In I939, the parliamentary wing began to display signs of 
disaffection with the Q.C.P. They were favourably disposed towards a U.A.P. 
resolution for 'greater cohesion and agreement' between the two parties - 
an attitude which was rebutted by both central council^ and conference.^ 
Rumblings of discontent also began to occur within the 
organization itself. Unhappy with the slow development of the organization, 
Alan J. Campbell, a grazier who had founded the Roma branch in 1936, 
called for the establishment of a western division. He envisioned the 
western division as being affiliated with the Q.C.P. but possessing complete 
autonomy in its own affairs, similar to the relationship then existing 
between the Northern Country Party or northern division and the Q.C.P.
The territory of this western division was to encompass the federal
12division of Maranoa and parts of the Darling Downs.
The western division was thus founded by Campbell at an
1 1
inaugaural meeting at Roma on February IO, I 9 A 0 .  Although annual con-
IAference had agreed to this concept in 1939, central council withheld
5.
approval. The division was not formally recognized and its autonomous 
status incorporated in the constitution until the next annual conference 
in 1940.16
These events inspired party members in the south-east corner
of the state to establish their own south-eastern division in 19^1.^
In 19^0, the parliamentary wing had tried to interest the
organization in U.A.P. proposals for 'amalgamation under a common name
and common policy1 - at least for the duration of the war. Central council
18defeated the proposals.
However, following the 19^1 state elections, the merger be­
tween the parliamentary wing of the Country Party and the U.A.P. finally
took place. A secret meeting was convened by the leader of the federal
19Country Party, Arthur Fadden, at Parliament House on April 27, 19^1*
At this meeting, the Country National Organization (C.N.O.) was inaug-
aurated. It was championed as a war-time measure, a forerunner to 'the
sinking of party political differences everywhere, and the formation of 
. 20a National Government'. Sir Fergus McMaster, a prominent pastoral ist
and a former treasurer of the Q.C.P., was elected president and G.F.R.
Nicki in (Murrumba) became leader of the new party in the House. All but
2 1one of the parliamentary wing of the Q.C.P. joined the C.N.O.
Central council was incensed at both the desertion of the
parliamentary wing and the secretive way in which the merger had been 
22executed. Over the next two years, bitter exchanges occurred between
John Leahy and Sir Fergus McMaster. The stand taken by Leahy and the
23 2kcentral council was endorsed by the western division, the N.C.P.,
25and the 19^ 1 Q.C.P. conference.
The C.N.O. failed to establish any proper organization at 
all. At the same time, the Q.C.P. organization began to fall into decline.
15
6 .
Preoccupation with the war took many people's minds off party politics.
No Q.C.P. conference was held in 1942 and there are only two recorded 
meetings of central council in that year. The N.C.P. was largely dis­
continued after 1941. A blow to the N.C.P.'s organization was the de­
parture of their energetic organizing secretary, J.J. Me Donald, into 
the armed forces in September, 1941. On July 16, 1943, the N.C.P. with­
drew its affiliation from the Q.C.P.
Thus, at the beginning of 1943, the Q.C.P. organization was 
in a serious state of decline. Membership had fallen off dramatically, 
morale was low, and the parliamentary wing had deserted the organization. 
Alan Campbell and the western division began proceedings to endorse a 
Q.C.P. candidate against Arthur Fadden at the 1943 federal elections.
At this juncture, the position began to improve. The
Q.C.P. and C.N.O. finally agreed to exchange preferences before the 
26federal election. Following the elections, a joint conference was
held on October 23, 1943 where the parliamentarians agreed to return
27to the fold of the Q.C.P. '
Prior to this conference, the outspoken Leahy had res­
igned as president in order to facilitate the return of the parliamentary 
28wing. In his place was elected Alan Campbell.
It was largely under the expert guidance of Campbell
that a re-structuring and rejuvination of the organization now took
place. At a conference at Toowoomba on June 15“16, 1944, the name of the
party was changed to Australian Country Party (Queensland) and a new
constitution was approved. Shortly afterwards, the N.C.P. held a con-
29ference where it decided to affiliate with the new body.
Organization in electorates now began in earnest. Branches 
and electorate councils were established and re-established. The party
7 .
secured the services of Colonel N.G. Hatton as its organizing secretary.
He supervised a team of paid organizers who enrolled thousands of new 
members.
Overall, by 19^, the organization was set to embark upon 
a period of growth and success. However, the course of development of the 
organization after 19^ was to be strongly influenced by the pattern of 
organizational structure and behaviour that emerged in these formative 
years. It is the various aspects of this pattern which it is now intended 
to discuss.
8 .
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Prominent amongst the developments in organizational structure 
and behaviour that occurred from 1936 to 19^4 was the preoccupation with 
survival or a drive to remain a separate and independent party.
A primary goal of any nascent organization is, of course, 
survival. However, many other factors dictated that the Country Party 
organization would be preoccupied with this phenomenon.
To begin with, one must mention certain political attitudes
evident throughout Australia's rural community and described in detail by 
I 2Bruce Graham and Don Aitkin . It has been common for rural folk to 
believe that only country people could understand country problems. The 
urban parties, both labor and non-labor, were felt to be unconcerned with 
rural problems. Only a separate and independent rural political party 
could champion country interests. A rural party was also needed to serve 
a sym bolic function - to express rural values in what was perceived as an 
urban dominated society. These kinds of attitudes were voiced particularly
3
strongly by the founder of the Q.C.P., J.A.J. Hunter, and by Alan Campbell.
A second major reason why the Q.C.P. would be concerned 
with survival was the sectional nature of its support. Limited to rural 
areas, it could never become a truly state-wide party. Instead, if it 
were to have a realistic chance of attaining office, it would need the 
support of an urban ally. It was well realized that any such alliance 
had the inherent danger of evolving into a complete amalgamation.
Thirdly, it has already been mentioned how the Country 
Party in Queensland continually failed to maintain an independent identity 
in previous years. Twice, in 1915 and in 1925, it merged with the urban
non-labor party. The organizational leaders were determined that this 
would not happen again.
In many ways, the Q.C.P. can be seen as an emerging third
party in an established or partially established two-party system. On
the one side was the Australian Labor Party, and on the other, the urban
non-labor party - at first the U.A.P., then the C.N.0.,and after the
£
dissolution of the latter, the Q.P.P. (Queensland Peoples' Party).
In this environment, the Q.G.P. faced a problem of survival
common to many emerging third parties. That is, the 'established interests'
continually tried to submerge the Q.C.P. within their own ranks. Between
the formation of the Q.C.P. in 1936 and the founding of the C.N.O. in
19^1, as many as six amalgamation overtures were made either pubiicly
or privately by the U.A.P.  ^ Of course, amalgamation of the parliamentary
wings of the political parties was finally achieved with the establishment
a
of the C.N.O. on April 27, 19^1* The metropolitan press became increasingly 
critical of the Q.C.P.'s independent existence over these years. At first, 
the Courier Mail welcomed the idea of a separate Country Party, as long
g
as it worked with the Nationalists to oppose the A.L.P. However,
following the 1938 elections, it called on the Q.C.P. to take heed of
9
the disastrous results and unite with the U.A.P. It supported the
formation of the C . N . O . a n d  attacked the stance taken by the Q.C.P.
organization.** The hostility of the press reached a peak in the final
days of the C.N.O. interlude. Following the N.C.P.'s disaffiliation from
the Q.C.P., the Courier Mail stated 'The N.C.P.'s decision to break with 
I 2
the factious Q.C.P. will give welcome unity to the Opposition Senate
. 1 3team1.
In the face of all this vocal opposition to its independent 
existence, how did the Q.C.P. in fact survive? To begin with, while the 
amalgamation overtures and the hostility of the metropolitan press kept
12.
the issue of survival prominent in the minds of the Q.C.P. organization,
the urban non-labor party was never strong enough, by itself, to pose a
real threat to the Q.C.P. The U.A.P. and later the Q.P.P. had few pari­
liiamentary members and little organization. They were Brisbane-based 
parties, neither having the strength nor the will to encroach upon rural 
electorates. Had they attempted to do so, they would have met consider­
able opposition. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Q.C.P. had a strong rural 
electoral base in the south-east corner of the state. Here, the country 
press was generally a strong supporter of the Q.C.P. One of the founders 
of the Stanthorpe branch, J.V. Scully, was also the proprietor and editor 
of the Stanthorpe Border Post.
Two events illustrate the comparative strength of the 
Q.C.P. and its non-labor ally. When Maher was elected to leader of the 
opposition in 1936, the Country Party did not even bother to consult the 
U.A.P. who only had three parliamentary representatives at the time.*“* 
Nicki in maintains that J.B. Chandler had wanted to become leader of the 
opposition after he entered parliament and formed the Q.P.P. in 19^3.
The parliamentary Country Party had little trouble in completely over-
I £
ruling the suggestion.
The greatest danger to the Q.C.P.'s independent status 
lay not in the strength of its urban ally but in the low degree of 
loyalty of its own parliamentary wing. This loyalty was weak enough to 
enable the parliamentarians to join up with the U.A.P. in 19^1. However, 
they rejoined the Country Party in 19^3* One can only speculate what 
enticed them to return. Although the Q.C.P. had been established for 
less than a decade, perhaps the politicians still feared the value of 
the party's 'ticket'. That is, they may have doubted that the support 
of their personal followers could overcome a challenge by endorsed Q.C.P. 
candidates. Moreover, the C.N.O. was organizationally weaker than either
13.
the U.A.P. or Q.P.P. ^  It had virtually no local branches in rural elect­
orates.
The ability of the Q.C.P. to maintain itself as a separate 
force during these years was also a function of the state of flux in the 
party system, at least on the non-labor side of the House. Even while 
Hunter was calling for the formation of a separate Country Party in 1935, 
a metropolitan 'ginger group' existed in the ranks of the C.P.N.P. They
I g
were campaigning for the establishment of a separate metropolitan party. 
This goal was of course achieved with the formation of the U.A.P. (Queens-
I o
land) in 1936, shortly after the Q.C.P. had been formed. Similarly, the 
formation of the Q.P.P. in 19^3 was, in some ways, part of the general 
reorganization of non-labor politics throughout Australia - as the old 
U.A.P. dissolved and the new Liberal Party gradually took its place. In 
this environment of 'party flux', an emerging political party naturally 
had greater chances of success.
Preferential voting is often highly advantageous for a 
new party seeking to draw support from one or more established parties.
At the same time, first-past-the-post voting will often restrict the 
inroads which a new party can make upon established party allegiances.
It may also polarize the opposition of the established parties who will 
then make greater efforts to destroy the newcomer. In Queensland, con­
tingent (optional preferential) voting operated until 19^2, after which 
first-past-the-post voting was introduced. Preferential voting was used 
at the federal level. However, the general tendencies of electoral sys­
tems mentioned above were not really relevant to the success or failure 
of the Q.C.P. Regardless of the voting system used, the Q.C.P. did not 
face a major threat from its non-labor ally on actual polling day because 
the two parties operated within geograptucal ly distinct areas.
The organization's preoccupation with survival is seen
\ k
most vividly in the 1936 constitution. Clause 7(i) specifically stated 
'The Central Council shall at all times, and under all circumstances pres 
erve the Country Party organization. It shall not become merged into or 
form part of any other political organization'. Clause 7(a) stated
'The Parliamentary Representatives of the Country Party may only, with 
the consent of a majority of the Country Party obtained in general con­
ference, form any alliance, or enter into any agreement, pact, or coal-
21ition with any other Parliamentary Party'. The Q.C.P. also required
its candidates for political office to sign a pledge which stipulated
that the candidate would, if elected, obey the constitution and rules 
22of the party.
By 19^, the clause referring to coalition agreements had 
disappeared; however, it remained an 'unwritten rule' that the parliamen­
tary wing would consult the organization before entering any coalition.
Overall, the anti-urban attitudes mentioned above, the 
Country Party's sectional and third party status, the history of sub­
mergence of the party within non-labor entities before 1936 and during 
the C.N.O. episode, and the constant pressure upon the party from est­
ablished interests to amalgamate into a united anti-labor force, dictated 
that the organization would remain concerned with survival for many years 
after 19^*
15.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL STRUCTURE
The organizational structure adopted by the Q.C.P. in 1936 
was basically a pyramidal hierarchy. This pattern is common to all major 
political parties throughout Australia. Such a structure is a response to 
'both the electoral situation and the need for the parties to establish 
links between the party and the mass of voters at all levels'.*
The general structure appears to have been strongly influ­
enced by the United Country Party in New South Wales. The latter had 
provided a provisional constitution for discussion at the inaugaural con­
ference of the Q.C.P. in March 1936. It was partly from this provisional
constitution that the first executive then drafted the constitution adopt-
2
ed at the August 1936 conference.
At the base of the pyramid were the branches of rank and fil 
members. They elected representatives to the next tier, the state elector­
ate councils, which were based on the boundaries of state electorates.
The functions of these councils were to control the local aspect of can­
didate selection, raise finance and conduct the local campaign. The 
councils were also required to overseer the branches and generally ensure 
that the organization kept running between elections.
Of course it must be remembered that state electorate 
councils were not formed in all rural electorates throughout this period. 
For example, in 1945, state electorate councils still had to be either
formed or re-formed in the Country Party seats of Albert, Fassifern,
3
Aubigny, Cunningham, and West Moreton.
The state electorate councils each elected three represent­
atives to a divisional electorate council, based on the boundaries of the 
federal electoral divisions. At first, these divisional councils were
17.
given the same powers and functions as the state electorate councils 
but with reference to federal rather than state matters. However, be­
fore they could be established properly, they became submerged within 
larger and more powerful regional structures. First the N.C.P. or 
northen division, then the western division and later the south-eastern 
division all exercised wide powers and control over their constitutionally 
defined territory.
At the apex of the pyramid was the annual conference. Only
conference held the authority to amend the policy or platform of the party
or change the constitution. State electorateAcouncils were each entitled
to send four delegates to conference. Smaller representation was «given
A
to electorates where no state electorate council had yet been formed.
Between conferences, the supreme authority in the organize 
at ion was central council. Conference elected nine people to this body - 
the president, immediate past president, three vice-presidents, a treasurer, 
and three other persons representing conference.^ in addition, central 
council included one representative from each electorate, two represent­
atives of the federal parliamentary party, and the leader and two members 
of the state parliamentary party.^
The 1938 constitution bestowed enormous powers upon central 
council. Briefly, council was given power over the endorsement of cand­
idates, the distribution of finance, and ‘all matters whatsoever relating 
to the Federal and State Elections'.^ It was given the power to 'decide
all questions whatsoever in dispute affecting the welfare of the orgartiz-
8ation'. It was constitutionally defined that should any of these powers
prove insufficient to meet any exigency 'authority is vested in central
council to take such action as it considers to be wise and necessary
9
in the interests of the organization1.
18.
The likeness to the constitution of the Country Party in 
New South Wales is most apparent in these all-embracing powers given to 
central council. However, as in N.S.W., one feels that these powers 
were defined largely as a final safeguard or ultimate weapon in a time 
of crisis.
Having said this, one must emphasize that until the demise 
of the organization after about 1-941, council tried and often succeded 
in exercising considerable control over the organization. This control 
will become more evident in the discussion of candidate selection in 
Chapter 9. Of course, the control never really extended to the northern 
division or N.C.P. which anyhow disaffiliated from July 16, 1943. The 
picture is further complicated after 1940, with the emergence of the 
'autonomous' western and south-eastern divisions.
When the party was reorganized in 1944, the north still 
retained much of its autonomy; however, the western and south-eastern 
divisions lost most of their autonomy, and the powers of the executive 
were even more clearly defined. Between central council meetings, con­
trol of the organization was now placed in the hands of a smaller man­
agement committee. This committee of twelve consisted of the president, 
the four vice-presidents, the leader and another representative of the 
state parliamentary party, a Queensland representative of the federal 
parliamentary party, the treasurer, managing director and two members 
of the council.^ Of special interest in the 1944 constitution was 
the centralization of finance. All money received by the organization 
was payable to central council. 20% of nett membership fees were 
available for state electorate councils and 10% to divisional councils; 
however, central council couldwithhold the remainder. Moreover, 75% 
of the membership funds distributed back to the divisional and electorate 
councils could still be called upon by central council 'for election or
referenda purposes'.
These constitutional powers developed from 1936 to 19^
laid the basis for a leading role by the executive in the organization
over future years. Of course, the way in which the powers were used
would depend largely upon the personality, resolution, and ability
of those who occupied the executive positions.
A final aspect of the Q.C.P.'s organizational structure
was its affiliation with the Australian Country Party Association.
12The decision to affiliate was taken at the 1937 conference. The 
party changed its name to Australian Country Party (Queensland) in 
19^, largely to emphasize its membership with this federal body.
2 0 .
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During these formative years, the organization strove 
to develop a mass party based on direct membership.
Membership was open to anyone over eighteen years of 
age ’who subscribed to the policy and platform of the party'* and who 
paid a fee which varied from 5/“ to 10/- per annum. In 19^4, it was 
stipulated that 'No member shall be a member of any other political 
party'
In actual fact, formal qualifications for both entry 
into the organization and retention of membership were extremely len­
ient. As will be seen, enrolment of members was a goal in itself, and
little or no effort was made to ensure that new members understood and
hsupported the party platform and policy. Unlike in the A.L.P. in
some states, a member was not censured or expelled if he failed to
attend a specified number of meetings. In fact, even if he attended
no meetings at all, action was not taken against him.
Outside of the north and the western divisions, the
method of enrolment was usually the annual canvass for members by an
organizer or local branch member. However, the N.C.P. instituted a
'bank order system'. This was a method of enrolment whereby a member
signed a form authorizing his bank to annually pay his membership
fee. At the time, the system was being used by Country Parties in all
other mainland states. Aitkin claims that it was first used by the
Western Australian Country Party who borrowed it from the Western
Australian farmers' organization in the 1920's. From there, it slowly
5
spread to the eastern states.
The system has important implications for the nature 
of membership itself. It usually enrolls a relatively high and stable
membership. Because the member escapes from the burden of annually
renewing his subscription, he will be less inclined to cancel tiis
membership whenever he encounters financial difficulties or becomes
temporarily dissatisfied with the organization. The bank order also
tends to enrol passive members. Thy psychological commitment invol-
6ved in annually renewing one’s membership has disappeared.
This method of recruitment was most actively used in
the western division under the inspiration of Alan Campbell. Campbell
pointed to its successful operation in the N.C.P. and in the Victorian
and New South Wales Country Parties.^ At a meeting of the western
divisional council on February 26, I9 AO, the visiting federal Country
Party leader, A.G. Cameron, had emphasized the value of this system
both to his own Country Party in South Australia and the Country Party
8
in Victoria.
As mentioned above, the method of enrolling members out­
side of the western division and the N.C.P. was usually the annual can­
vass. As organizing secretary, J.J. McDonald, campaigned vigorously to
have the bank order introduced at Q.C.P. headquarters; however, this was 
9
not done. The system may have occasionally been introduced independ­
ently at the local level. For example, the Maleny branch appears to 
have introduced a bank order at this time.*^
There are no detailed statistics available on the number 
of members actually enrolled by the organization throughout this period. 
However, there is still enough data to make some tentative conclusions.
Membership in the north was never particularly high.** 
Membership elsewhere was often quite high in the initial stages of the
Q.C.P.'s history. In 1937, the Stanley electorate had a membership of
12approximately 1,000. Murrumba had a membership of approximately 300-
13AOO throughout most of this period.
22.
However, after this initial success,
23.
membership In many electorates appears to have declined, often quite
I ij.
dramatically. The minutes of the Maleny branch in the Stanley ele­
ctorate recorded a branch membership of approximately 110 in 1937•^^
16By 1939, this figure had declined to 2k. In I9AI, the electorate of
Albert had only 80 financial members.^ By 19^5, it was reported that
only kS branches were functioning properly. This compared with a total of
I87 branches which was the highest figure achieved before the organization
18
began to decline in the I9A0's .
Membership in the western division was quite high and 
it remained more stable than elsewhere - partly due to the operation 
of the bank order there. In January I9AI, less than twelve months after
19the division had been founded, there was a recorded membership of 3,000.
20This membership had been organized into over 50 branches. The existence
of a strong A.L.P. and A.W.U. organization in rural Queensland at this
time must be seen as a major stimulus to the western division’s ambitious
efforts to develop a large mass membership. Alan Campbell readily ad-
21mits that he was highly impressed by the Labor Party organization.
While most of his colleagues also saw the advantages of copying the
A.L.P.'s mass membership, it will be seen below that they differed with
Campbell over the question of organizational affiliation.
Again, while there are still no accurate statistics
available, it appears that the vast majority of Country Party members
22recruited in this period were primary producers. There was little
effort to induce country townsmen to join. The secretary of the Dal by
branch, D.S. Armstrong, maintained that only five people in the town
of Dalby (whose population was approximately A,000 at the time) were
financial members and that 'the same position exists in nearly all the
23
country towns throughout the Maranoa electorate'. Campbell was prim­
arily interested in enrolling graziers into his western division. In
2 4.
fact, the regional body to which the 1934 conference gave its assent was
24initially termed 'the grazing division1. Dam ion Kennedy, a member of
the Kilcoy branch, (Stanley electorate), related how only one townsman
ever attended a local meeting. He never returned, declaring that the
25Q.C.P. was just a 'farmer's party'.
This homogenous nature of the Q.C.P.'s membership was
certainly a source of strength and stability for the organization,
26precluding serious faction fighting and fissiparous tendencies.
However, the homogenous membership would not necessarily lead to
increased electoral support. The Kilcoy townsman mentioned above 
would not presumably have felt inclined to vote for the Q.C.P. J.J. 
McDonald was particularly aware of the need for the Q.C.P. to seek 
support from all sections of the rural community. For example, follow­
ing J.A.J. Hunter's retirement from federal parliament in 1940, the 
Q.C.P. endorsed R.S. McGeoch to contest his seat of Maranoa. He lost 
to the A.L.P. candidate, F.P. Baker. McDonald insisted that this occ­
urred because McGeoch had portrayed a wealthy grazier image, alienating
q 27
townsmen and farmers alike.
Eldersveld's words are relevant here 'political parties
are constantly beset by their need to reconcile two divergent aims in
their recruitment of members: the maintenance of group solidarity, and
28the achievement of broad social representation'.
This drive to create a direct mass membership party was
given impetus by the peculiar position of many of Queensland's primary
producer organizations. All organizations registered under the Primary
Producers' Organization and Marketing Act of 1926 were prevented from
giving financial support or any other assistance to the political parties.
One can speculate that had this not been the case, the
organizational leaders would have had less incentive to develop a mass
29
organization. The New South Wales Country Party until 19^ served as
an example. The New South Wales Graziers' Association and the Farmers
30and Settlers' Associations were really the back-bone of the party.
However, it was more the example of trade union affiliation with the
A.L.P. which caused certain elements in the Q.C.P. to wish that the
producer associations could affiliate with the Country Party, Alan
Campbell, in particular, was very impressed by the advantages accruing
to the A.L.P. through the affiliation of the trade union movement. He
continually urged that the Q.C.P. 'follow Labor's example and base our
political organization upon the producer organizations [not under the
Act] in the same manner as the Labor Unions combine at the Trades Hall
3 1for that purpose.1 Such affiliation would provide a regular financial
income, premises, man-power for electoral work, and expert policy advice.
Perceiving these advantages, those organizations not
registered under the Act were sometimes approached by members of the
party to affiliate. Prior to the March 1936 Conference, the United
Cane-Growers' Association (U.C.G.A.) and a number of branches of the
Queensland Farmers' Union (Q.F.U.) informed Hunter that they would
32
affiliate when the Country Party was established. This never 
eventuated. The most serious attempt to induce an organization to 
affiliate was Alan Campbell's campaign within the United Graziers'
■3-3
Association (U.G.A.).
The type of affiliation which Campbell envisioned was
34
not one leading to 'indirect membership1. Instead, affiliation
would entitle the U.G.A. to a fixed number of ex officio positions
35on central council. At the same time, he urged that all U.G.A.
36members should join the party individually. If enough members
did this, he hoped ‘all [U.G.A.] branches would become outposts working
37for the return of members to Parliament'. A voluntary political
38
levy on U.G.A. members was also planned.
2 5.
2 6 .
In his campaign, Campbell stressed what he perceived as
the advantages accruing to the New South Wales Graziers' Association
through its affiliation with the Country Party in that state.^ He
felt that affiliation had induced the Country Party in New South Wales
Ao
to implement legislation which greatly benefited graziers. Affil­
iation would thus make the Q.C.P. the true spokesman for the grazing 
industry.
Campbell wanted to have a plebiscite conducted on the 
question; however, the issue was finally decided through special general 
meetings of the U.G.A.'s component district associations. All the
AIassociations came out against affiliation, often quite decisively.
The arguments put foreward against affiliation furnish
an interesting example of the competition and jealousy that can arise
between organizations which share the same goals and represent the
same people. It was claimed that affiliation would jeopardize the
U.G.A.'s large membership and organization. Members already felt
burdened by the U.G.A.'s stock levy of 7/6d. per 1,000 sheep. If a
political levy were imposed upon this, discontent would grow even
h2deeper. Another reason put foreward against affiliation was that
political action by the U.G.A. could place the organization in 'an
A3invidious position as in 1920/23.' This statement perhaps refers
to the U.G.A.'s suspected involvement in the Brennan bribery scandal of 
AAthat period.
Despite these moves for organizational affiliation by
Alan Campbell and other leading members of the Q..C.P., there was also
considerable opposition to the proposal within the party. Damion
Kennedy, a member of central council, maintains that it was never a
A5popular proposal with the majority of party members. Campbell 
appreciated the advantages which could have resulted from the affiliation
2 7 .
of the producer organizations. However, these would only have been 
short term benefits. Many of the Q.C.P. executives perhaps realized 
that, in the long term, affiliation could have restricted the party's 
independence and harmed its image. Instead, the organizational leaders 
were more attracted by the benefits to be gained from a direct member­
ship. Campbell, the strongest advocate of organizational affiliation, 
was also a great champion of the direct mass membership party. As al­
ready mentioned, he urged that U.G.A. members should join the Q.C.P. 
individually. In fact, many did this. There was probably a close corr­
elation between the Maranoa Graziers'Association and the western divi­
sion.
Overall, between the years 1936 to I9^> the Q.C.P. began
kGto develop a mass membership party as defined by Duverger. It ful­
filled the litmus test for this party-type in the registration of members
kl
and the orderly collection of subscriptions. The trend for a direct 
mass membership had been chiefly a response to the needs of universal 
suffrage. However, it was given a boost by the operation of the Primary 
Producers' Organization and Marketing Act of 1926. As finance and supp­
ort from primary producer associations was closed, there was an addit­
ional need to develop a direct mass membership based on a relatively 
high affiliation fee.
In the following chapter, it is intended to examine the 
nature of participation by this mass membership.
28.
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The mass membership developed by the Q.C.P. was organized 
at the local level into branches.
The 1938 and IS h k  constitutions both devoted a full page to 
their composition, powers and functions. One suspects that these det­
ailed rules were laid down to establish uniformity and conformity 
of action at the local level. It is evident from the discussion in 
chapter k  that an important trend from 1936 to \ S k k  was the development 
of a tightly structured organization, headed by central council. The 
I938 constitution had stipulated that one half of membership fees were 
to be retained by the branch.* By I9AA, branches were not even mentioned 
in the rules governing the distribution of finance. The I9AA constit­
ution also stipulated that management committee ‘shall exercise full
2
control over all branches'. Central council was given the sole right
3
to expel members and abolish branches.
Thus, given little finance or initiative, it would appear 
that branches were intended to be little more than administrative and elec­
toral units under the control and direction of the upper levels of the 
'pyramidal hierarchy1. Their primary activities were usually conceived 
to be participation in the local election campaign, manning the polling 
booths on election day, and keeping the member of parliament informed
It .
about local issues. They were also expected to raise finance, enrol 
new members, and nominate candidates. As mentioned in chapter 5, there 
was no attempt to maintain a level of activism by requiring that members 
attend a specified number of meetings. Branches were themselves only 
constitutionally required to meet annually to elect office-bearers.
However, a few organizational leaders did hope that 
branches would play a wider and more active role in the party struc­
ture. Firstly they expected branches to exercise their right to in­
itiate policy resolutions and submit them to conference, either dir­
ectly, or through the state electorate council. Secondly, branches 
were sometimes seen as possessing a political education function.
Alan Campbell strongly emphasized this aspect in his western division.
He felt that if guest speakers were invited to branch meetings or if 
the meetings included the discussion and explanation of some policy, 
then this would invoke interest and 'get people talking1 throughout 
the community. The interest created and information disseminated 
would hopefully have an electoral pay-off.”*
Regardless of the intentions of the founders of the 
Q.C.P., how did the branches operate in practice? Unfortunately, a 
serious shortage of branch records prevents one from reaching definite 
conclusions on this subject. The author gained access only to the 
minutes of the Maleny branch which functioned within the Stanley 
electorate. However, some tentative impressions can still be ob­
tained from these records as well as from statements by various 
surviving figures.
The Maleny records suggest that some branches certainly 
did perform the wider functions mentioned above (however, as will be 
seen they were performed only be a minority of activists). There was 
a vital interest displayed in the development and nature of the em­
erging consti tut ion, platform and policy. Many resolutions were sub­
mitted to annual conference on these matters. The branch ensured that 
it sent delegates to all conferences and state electorate council 
meetings(held at Kilcoy). It even instructed its delegates how to vote
32.
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on certain motions. The deep interest in the nature of the organiz­
ation is seen most vividly in a dispute which occurred in 1939 when 
central council proposed to relax conditions for representation on 
annual conference.^ The branch submitted the following motion to 
a Stanley electorate council meeting - 'Stanley (Electorate Council 
sic) requests that central council give an assurance that forth­
coming August conference be called in accordance with rule 9(^).
Failing such assurance Stanley Council reserve the right to recon­
sider further representation and participation within party organiz-
g
ation'. Invariably, a meeting was convened immediately after annual
conference or the state electorate council in order to discuss what
had taken place. Between the years 1937 to 1939, approximately one
meeting was held every month.
The Maleny branch took action to combat the growing
influence of the social credit movement in the Stanley electorate.
At a meeting on September 22, 1937, it was resolved that 'Delegates
to Electorate Conference obtain literature to combat Social Credit
q
in all parts of the electorate'. It was later proposed to conduct 
a debate on the monetary system with the Social Credit Party.
The Dalby branch in the western division also stressed this political 
education function. The local secretary, D.S. Armstrong, proposed 
to present a paper on some aspect of the party policy at each meeting 
in order to provoke discussion.**
Despite this evidence, one feels that most branches took 
a far narrower view of their role in the party structure. The unusually 
high activism of branches such as the one at Maleny can be explained 
by two main factors.
Firstly, one must note the distinction between member-
12oriented branches and party-oriented branches. The former usually
exist where there is intense loyalty to the local member of parliament
something which is not uncommon in Australia's rural community. They
tend to see their role as little more than ensuring the re-election of
their parliamentary representative. Party-oriented branches are more
rare. They occassionally arise in electorates not held by the party
or in electorates where the Country Party member is not particularly
popular. Duncan Macdonald, the member for Stanley, 1938“1953, was
rather an aloof figure, rarely taking any interest in the local organiz
at ion. He beat his nearest rival (S.J. Col lard, a member of the
Maleny branch) by only a few votes, in the plebiscite conducted in 
131938. When Macdonald joined the C.N.O. in 1941, the Maleny branch 
demanded that he attend a local meeting to 'explain his reasons for
, 14his action politically in recent merger1. Even before the ascension 
of Duncan Macdonald,^ the branch had obviously been more party-or­
iented than member-oriented. At a meeting on September 22, 1937, it 
was resolved that 'members of State Parliament meet Electorate Councils
at least four times a year and render an account of their stewardship'.
A second factor involved in the wider perspective taken
by a few branches was their proximity to Brisbane. Members within 
electorates close to the capital city naturally found it easier to 
attend conferences than their counterparts in outlying electorates. 
Greater access to information about what was occurring at conference 
and central council tended to encourage greater interest and partic­
ipation at the local level.
However, to repeat, the vast majority of branch members 
were passive, taking little or no part in the organization except at 
election time or when a local pre-select ion was being conducted. Damion 
Kennedy, a member of the Kilcoy branch (Stanley electorate) confirmed 
that 'meetings were rarely held and most rank and file were not part­
icularly interested in developments at the top'.*^ Similarly, Mrs.p. 
Innes, a branch member from the Gin Gin area and later a foundation
35.
member of the women's section stated 'As in most organizations, the rank
and file play a negligible part, especially in the formation of policy
and constitution. There will, of course, always be a few - very few -
rank and file members who are vocal at all levels at conferences and
meetings, but the hierarchy generally go on their own sweet way. Supp-
18
orted naturally by the majority'. Even the meetings of the 'activist'
Maleny branch usually attracted only about half a dozen people. They
were invariably the office holders. In fact, executive committee meet-
19
ings were often called in lieu of a general meeting. The nomination
of a candidate by the Maleny branch attracted kO and then 80 members
20
to two consecutive meetings; however, at the following meeting, numbers
21
declined to the usual half dozen.
To summarize, branches were kept functioning between
elections by a few activists, usually the committee members. The
rank and file participated only at election time or when a pre-
selecticnwas being conducted. This pattern has continued since I9A4.
It is not peculiar to the Country Party, but is evident amongst the mass
22
membership of all major political parties.
These facts may appear disturbing to the few activists
and devoted party members; however, when everything is considered,
perhaps this pattern is sufficient to keep the organization functioning.
In referring to the passive rank and file, Aitkin states 'These people,
whatever their precise attachment to the party, are the rock on which
23
the modern mass political organization rests'. J They provide finance 
through their membership fees, and they constitute a vital reserve of 
man-power which can be mobilized at election time. Finally, despite 
their apathy, the rank and file members may boost the morale of the 
militants or activists. Membership may only indicate a psychological 
commitment to the party. However, when thousands of these members
are enrolled, the result may be to develop a sense of pride and achieve­
ment amongst the organizational leaders.
3 7 .
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CHAPTER 7
FINANCE
Throughout these early years, one of the dominant goals
of the Q.C.P. organization was financial independence. There was a
strong desire to escape from reliance upon outside donations and to
base the party's income as much as possible upon affiliation fees
from the organization's mass membership. As seen in chapter 5» this
goal was partly dictated by legislation which prevented most primary
producer organizations from donating funds. However, it was also a
response to the serious shortcomings of a system which relied
exclusively on donations. These are unpredictable, they can restrict
the party's independence, and they can harm its image. The founders
of the Q.C.P. were fully aware of these factors. As they saw it,
a major reason for the failure of the C.P.N.P. was its image as a
party controlled financially from secret sources.* Similarly, one
of the most common attacks levelled upon the C.N.O. was that it was
2
the instrument of southern financial interests. A central council 
resolution condemning the C.N.O. declared that the party was 
'controlled by big highly organized political forces outside the 
State of Queensland and which are against the best interests of the
3
primary producers, workers and every elector of this State'.
Addressing a conference of the western division in 19^0, Alan Campbell 
emphasized 'the urgent need for our Division to wholly finance itself 
for both organizing and campaigning, alternatively we forfeit our 
political independence. In fact if our organization is not prepared 
to wholly finance all its activities it degenerates into a rich man's
2j,
playtoy'. These words echoed similar views in the north. At the 
1939 annual conference of the N.C.P., the organizing secretary,
39.
J.J. McDonald, stated 'every penny spent in last financial year was
collected from our own members and subscribers in North Queensland.
We can therefore claim with pride that we have no financial
entanglements with any other Organization or section ..........
we have shown the world that a Country Party can be financed without
5
any outside or secret funds'.
In pursuit of this goal of financial autonomy, one of
the first actions of the Q.C.P. central council after the August 1936
£
conference was to establish a finance committee and a trust account.
If the party were forced to accept donations then it would not allow 
these funds to influence its behaviour. This noble philosophy was 
perhaps a little tarnished by the fact that two prominent members of 
the U.G.A., Alan Campbell and A.J.B. McMaster, were elected to the 
finance committee. It is suspected that the U.G.A. was one of the 
major contributors to party funds at this time. In September 1936, 
another member of the U.G.A. executive, J.M. Campbell, was invited 
to join the committee.^
The Q.C.P. organization never achieved in practice 
the position of financial independence it desired. It remained in 
serious financial difficulty for most of the period under review.
Alan Campbell claims that the 5/” membership fee barely covered the
g
rent of the office. In 19^0, annual conference rejected a motion
(submitted by the western division) to increase membership fees to 
o
one pound. Prior to the 1938 state elections, the position was so 
critical that Alan Campbell and another western grazier, John McCormack, 
felt obliged to jointly guarantee one thousand five hundred pounds 
towards the cost of the campaign.*^
The above statement by McDonald to the N.C.P. conference 
in 1939 indicates that the north enjoyed far more success in the area 
of finance. Employing the bank order system, it imposed a voluntary
40.
production levy of Id per ton on canegrowers.** In 1935, these orders
constituted an income of one thousand-one thousand five hundred pounds.
In 1939, it was reported that approximately one thousand six hundred
13pounds had been collected'outside the cane areas'.
However, it was in the western division that one finds
the most energetic and successful efforts to reach a position of
financial autonomy. Campbell suggests that the lack of initiative by
central council in the area of finance was one of the chief reasons
14for the formation of the division in the first place. The minimum
membership fee was raised to one pound per annum. Inspired by the
15N.C.P.'s levy on sugar growers, Campbell also implemented a levy on 
primary producers. The rates were fixed at
(a) 10/- per 100 head of sheep
(b) one pound per I,000 head of cattle
(c) agriculture - 10/- per 100 acres
(d) dairying - 6d per cow. ^
These levies were all collected by the bank order system as in the north. 
This both reduced the cost of collection and provided a reliable, on­
going source of funds for the division. Before long, the chief organizer,
Dr. Watson Brown, had enrolled an income of four thousand pounds per 
17annum.
In 1944, Campbell took his energy and experience into
the presidency of the party. Affiliation fees were raised to one 
18guinea. Over the next half decade, thousands of new members would 
join the organization on this rate under the bank order system. The 
result was that by the early 1950's, the organization was closer to a 
position of financial autonomy than it had ever been; however, the 
situation soon deteriorated. The problem of finance again plagued 
the organizational leaders just as it had plagued their predecessors 
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In 1936, the founders of the Q.C.P._had hoped to develop 
a close-knit organization under the central control of the executive. 
However, over the next five years, three separate movements for regional 
autonomy developed within the organization. The strongest and most 
successful movement was the demand by the N.C.P. or northern division 
for an independent status within the Q.C.P. The other two movements 
for local autonomy were seen in the formation of the western division 
in I9A0 and the south-eastern division in I9AI.
The demand for local control by Country Party members 
in north Queensland was principally a function of the strong feelings 
of regionalism which have always been evident in that part of the state. 
Numerous New State movements have arisen, supported by people of all 
political allegiances. Residents in north Queensland have often felt 
removed from and neglected by the 'power wielders' in the southern half 
of the state. One must remember that the N.C.P. already existed and 
had developed a strong feeling of regional independence even before the 
formation of the Q.C.P. in 1936.* They held their own conferences, and 
whether or not they were legally affiliated with the C.P.N.P. after
2
I925, they still insisted that they were an autonomous northern body. 
After 1936, regional feeling within the N.C.P. was exacerbated by 
differences in the composition of membership enrolled in the north and 
in the south. Membership in the north largely consisted of canegrowers 
and farmers. In the Q.C.P., most members from the south-east were 
also farmers (or dairyfarmers); however, in the west, the membership 
was almost exclusively graziers, thousands of whom were enrolled when 
Campbell founded his western division. Although the latter division 
was largely independent of the central organization, the composition
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of its membership was sufficient to earn the Q.C.P. an image of a rich
3
graziers' party in the eyes of many northerners.
From the very beginning, the regionalism inherent within
the N.C.P. demanded the careful attention of central council. The
northern body had strongly supported the formation of the Q.C.P. in
1936; however, i t  was some time before it  o f f ic ia l ly  joined the new
party. Before a f f i l ia t in g ,  the northerners insisted that they should
4
retain their own constitution and rules. They also demanded that at 
least one Country Party nominee on Senate ballots was to be a resident 
of the north. Furthermore, the N.C.P. was to be given equal representation 
on the selection committee.^
At the I937 annual conference, the constitution was 
amended in order to f a c il it a t e  the entry of the north. Rule 3h declared 
that 'where any Divisional Council or Federal Divisional Council so 
desires and State Conference approval, such Federal Divisional Council 
or Councils may combine for the purpose of forming a Division of the 
Organization1. Under this rule, it  was resolved that the N.C.P. or 
the 'Northern Division' constituted the two federal electorates of 
Herbert and Kennedy as well as the 14 state electorates encompassed 
within this territory. Over this area, the division was granted 'fu ll  
and complete autonomy'. It was given 'fu ll  power and authority to 
control its finances,enter into and be solely responsible for its  
contractural obligations and the selection of its  Parliamentary 
Candidates subject to the Central Council having the right to endorse 
or refuse to endorse any person nominating as Candidate in such Division 
consistent with the main objects of the Queensland Country Party.^
In I939, the N.C.P. f in a lly  amended its  own constitution
g
in order to f in alize  its membership with the Q.C.P. on the above terms. 
However, while the two organizations usually worked in harmony, the 
relationship sometimes deteriorated. On July l 6 , 1943 , the N.C.P.
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decided to cancel its affiliation with the southern party. McDonald 
claimed that this action had been taken because the Q.C.P. had denied 
the party its customary representative on the Senate team for the 1943 
federal elections.*^ However, John Leahy asserted that no official 
request had ever been received from the N.C.P. to have a candidate 
placed on the Senate ballot. In fact, said Leahy, McDonald had even 
suggested to him that the Q.C.P. should refrain altogether from 
nominating any Senate candidates. The C.N.O. had endorsed three Senate 
candidates, and McDonald felt that they should be supported by the Q.C.P. 
It turned out that one of the candidates on the C.N.O. Senate ballot 
was McDonald himself.^
The N.C.P.'s acceptance of a position on the C.N.O.
Senate ballot highlights another feature of the party. It was generally
more favourably disposed towards non-labor unity than was the Q.C.P.
organization. Bertei had detected this feature in his study of non-
12labor politics in north Queensland (1907“ 1929)-
After 1941, both the N.C.P. and the Q.C.P. organizations 
collapsed as the European and Pacific wars grew more intense. It was 
not until 1944 that action was taken to revive the parties. The N.C.P. 
was invited to join a restructured Country Party called the Australian 
Country Party (Q1 Id.). A conference was convened by the N.C.P.
September 30 - October I, 1944 to consider the organization's future.
The proceedings of this conference emphasized the strong anti-labor 
orientation of much of the organization. In his organizer's report, 
McDonald stated unequivocally 'if I thought that the Q.P.P. Policy 
had a greater appeal than our own I would unhesitatingly recommend 
that they take over the whole organization and that this Conference
should wind up our own Organization and wholeheartedly support them'. 
Shortly before this, McDonald had written to Hunter 'you have either 




and some Electorates form up with the Q.P.P.'. The 1944 conference
also considered changing the party's name to the North Queensland Party
in order to cement the anti-labor forces in the north. However, this
motion was defeated and it was finally resolved to affiliate with the
A.C.P. (Q'ld.), provided that the organization's management committee
15could negotiate satisfactory terms.
Among the conditions demanded by the N.C.P. were that 
the party was to remain an ‘autonomous body with control over its own 
funds and the right of selecting its own candidates and retaining its 
own Constitution'.^ It specifically demanded the right to select one 
Senate candidate at each federal election.*^
The A.C.P. (Q'ld.) conference held December 6, 1945 
approved these requests and so the N.C.P. reaffiliated with the southern 
organization, still retaining much of the autonomy it had enjoyed in the 
years 1936-1944.
The western division established in 1940 constituted the
second movement for local control within the Q.C.P. organization.
However, the causes here had little to do with sentiment of regionalism.
Campbell founded the division mainly as a protest against the lack of
success of the Q.C.P. organization in its early years. Campbell believed
that more intensive organizing was needed. He insisted that the party's
financial problems could only be overcome if the 5/" membership fee was
raised. However, any such suggestions were, according to Campbell,
18‘discredited by old hands'. His disillusionment with the organization
grew more intense when he and John McCormack were forced to donate
one thousand five hundred pounds towards the 1938 election campaign.
The poor results obtained in the ensuing elections finally convinced
Campbell that only two options remained - 'either our withdrawal from





As mentioned in chapter 2, the western division did not
gain immediate approval from central council after it was established
in February 10, I9A0, despite the fact that the 1939 annual conference
had assented to the general concept. The division was eventually given
constitutional recognition at the I9A0 annual conference (August 9”I0).
This was done under the same clause which had been drafted to give the
N.C.P. 'full and complete autonomy1 three years earlier. The division's
sovereignty extended over the federal electorates of Maranoa and part of
Darling Downs, as well as all state electorates included in this wide
area. The powers conferred upon the division were exactly the same as
those given to the N.C.P. That is, the division remained affiliated
with the Q.C.P. but was given 'full and complete autonomy' over its
own affairs, including finance, the selection of candidates, and any
20contractual obligations. A constitution was now drawn up and a head
office established at Roma. Campbell next began to implement his ideas
about organization which he had been unable to implement within the
Q.C.P. These ideas were discussed in chapter A - an extensive membership
drive by a team of paid organizers, the bank order system, a higher
membership fee, and the implementation of a stock levy. Great emphasis
was also placed upon party publicity. Campbell realized that elections
were not usually won during an election campaign. The public also had
to be subjected to a steady inflow of propaganda over a considerable 
21period of time. M.A. Hardman Knight was appointed as a paid pubiicity 
officer. He wrote weekly articles and submitted them to the country 
press for publication. No analysis has been made of the general att­
itude of the rural press towards the division at this time; however, 
it is interesting to note Campbell's comments with regard to the Graziers1 
Journal which was the official publication of the U.G.A. - 'The Graziers' 
Journal continues to give us substantial support, in fact, about as much
kl.
as if we controlled it'. Hardman Knight also developed a monthly news­
paper of approximately 20 pages called *The Countrymanr. This was dis­
tributed to the household of every member.
At the 19^3 federal elections, the western division en­
dorsed C.F. Adermann to contest the seat of Maranoa which the party had 
lost when Hunter retired in 1940. Adermann defeated the sitting Labor 
member, thus earning the honour of being the only candidate throughout 
Australia to wrest a seat from the A.L.P. This victory must have given 
Campbell's ideas about organiation considerable weightage throughout the 
fractured Country Party ranks.
When John Leahy resigned from the presidency of the Q.C.P.
organization on October 22, 19^3, Alan Campbell willingly took over the
2kposition. He and his off-si der, John McCormack, now took a leading 
role in the revival and restructuring of the Country Party organization. 
The new constitution adopted at the 19^ conference (June 15"!6) bore 
the impression of these two men. It was on their initiative, that the 
organization was officially divided into four divisions - the western 
division, south-eastern division, central division, and northern div­
ision. Each was given representation on both central council and the
25new executive body, the management committee. However, the autonomous 
nature of the western division was willingly terminated and the powers 
over candidate selection, finance, and other matters reverted to central 
council. Campbell had formed the division largely out of frustration 
with the central organization. Now that he was given the chance of lead­
ing that organization and implementing his ideas within it, he naturally 
favoured greater unity and centralization of power under his leadership. 
Similarly, most rank and file members of the western division were quite 
happy to see the recentralization of power under central council in 19^. 
Like Campbell, they had originally been alienated from the Q.C.P. by the
23
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latters stagnation. Now that the organization more closely fitted their 
aspirations, the western members were prepared to render their full supp­
ort. Three of the four members which conference elected to central coun-
26cil in 1944 were from the western division. Campbell was confirmed as
president and another westerner, Godfrey Morgan Snr., was elected treas- 
27
urer. On Campbell's retirement from the presidency in 1951, John Me
Cormack was elected in his place.
A third attempt to decentralize the Q.C.P. organization
occurred with the formation of a south-eastern division, following the
281941 state elections. Little information is available on this regional 
body. It sought and probably obtained constitutional recognition as an 
autonomous affiliate of the Q.C.P. at the 1941 annual conference (August 
8-9).29
The constitution and rules developed by the south-eastern
division were strongly influenced by those of the western division. Some
30passages are obviously direct translations. It was stated that 'the
south-eastern division of the Queensland Country Party shall possess
full and complete autonomy in the management and control of its affairs,
31organization and finances...' Its sovereignty was declared to extend
over approximately 21 state electorates in the south-east corner of the 
32state.
One feels that the south-eastern division was created 
for the same reasons as the western division. That is, members in the 
south-east were disillusioned with the sluggish development of the Q.C.P. 
organization. It was felt that central council was not displaying ad­
equate leadership or imagination. At the Q.C.P. conference, August 
8-9, 1941, the Kenilworth branch (Cooroora electorate) recommended 
'the abolition of central council as at presently defined to be replaced
by a State Council of Divisional Organizations consisting of three
33Councellors from each division'. However, like their western countei—  
parts, members in the south-east were quite happy to see their
'autonomous powers' revert to central council In 19^ when It became 
obvious that concerted efforts were being made to expand and strengthen 
the organization. Their proximity to Brisbane meant that members from 
the south-east did not feel removed from an organization whose locus 
of power lay in the capital city.
The outstanding feature of the Country Party organization 
in 19^^ was no longer its decentralization and regional autonomy but the 
centralization of powers in the executive. Only the north escaped from 
this trend. The northern division retained much of its independence, re­
flecting the powerful force of regionalism in that part of the state.
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Selection of candidates to contest elections is one of the
chief functions of a political organization which is oriented towards
securing parliamentary representation. It really involves two processes,
the earlier stage of recruitment where the aspiring candidate acquires
the necessary qualifications and the second, more mechanical stage where
the applicant receives o ff ic ia l party endorsement. As data has not been
collected on the in it ia l  stage of recruitment,^ this discussion will
2
centre on the second stage - 'the mechanics of seeking office '.
The selection process becomes particularly important in 
electorates where a party's voting support is so high that its candidate 
will almost certainly be returned at elections. The Country Party has 
always held a considerable number of these seats, especially in the south­
east corner of the state. In such electorates, the selection process will 
attract great interest because it  becomes a 'de facto' election of the 
local member of parliament. It  is partly for this reason that detailed
3
rulesof procedure will be drawn up by the organization.
The two most outstanding features of the selection procedure
developed by the QCP were the operation of the plebiscite system and the
compulsory nature of that system.
At the time, the plebiscite was employed by the Victorian
and West Australian Country Parties and the Liberal and Country League in
South Australia. However, in adopting this method, the QCP organization
appears to have been more influenced by its operation within the A.L.P. in
A
Queensland. The exact reasons why the plebiscite was preferred overother 
methods of candidate selection remains unclear. Perhaps the ALP's electoral 
successes in Queensland convinced the Country Party leaders that the system 
usually ensured the emergence of a candidate most popular with both the
53.
rank and f i l e  membership and the body of electors. The p leb isc ite  is 
certainly the most democratic way for a po lit ica l organization to select 
its candidates. I t  may also serve the function of a mi ni-campaign, 
boosting the interest and morale of the local organization.
The compulsory nature of the plebisc ite  was embodied
within clause 20 of the 1936 constitution. This clause stated 'That when
more than one candidate is nominated for either a Federal or State Election,
and the reports concerning such Candidates are satis factory , the Divisional
or Electorate Council concerned shall appoint a Returning Officer to
conduct a P le b isc ite .. . i** Thus, a s i t t in g  member of parliament could be
automatically required to enrol for a p lebiscite  i f  another candidate
nominated for his seat. This aspect of compulsion appears to have been
a response to strong feelings among many in the executive of the organization
that parliamentarians needed to be 'kept on their toes '.  I f  a member of
parliament was not championing the cause of his party and electorate to
the sat is faction  of the organization, and i f  someone nominated for his seat,
he faced the danger of losing party endorsement in a p lebisc ite. Two of
the greatest advocates of the compulsory p lebiscite, Alan Campbell and
£
J.J. McDonald, clearly saw the value of the system in th is l igh t. Their 
attitudes towards po lit ic ian s  w ill  be discussed in the following chapter; 
however, one should mention here that they both held strong beliefs that 
the gaining of o ff ice  by po lit ic ian s  led them into a false  sense of se l f -  
importance. According to McDonald, members of parliament were prone to 
think they were the 'so i l  of the earth [ s ic ] ' .  As such, they would often 
neglect the real needs of their electorate and party.^ S im ilar ly , Campbell 
stated in an address to the council of the western d iv is ion  'many of these 
gentlemen (members of parliament) appear to believe they possess a "Divine
g
Right" to their seats - a l i fe  long future of undisputed possession.'
At f i r s t ,  the plebiscite  system appears to have been received 
with some misgivings by many rank and f i l e  members. It  was feared that the
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system could be abused as had sometimes occurred in the ALP up to that
time. Campbell maintains that he active ly  campaigned against these
qattitudes. Referring to the p leb iscite conducted in the Maranoa electorate 
prior to the 1940 federal elections, he stated 'We are told by "old 
campaigners" that i t  was impossible to conduct a "clean" P leb isc ite . This,
I am more than pleased to say, has been a "clean" and honest P leb isc ite  
and I trust that a ll Plebiscites conducted by the Division shall be as clean
and honest.'^  The framing of specific  and detailed rules of procedure
c 11 often helped overcome in it ia l scepticism of the p leb iscite  method. The
1936 constitution stipulated that the Local Authority Act 1902-1934 was
12to serve as a basis for these rules.
S im ila rly , the compulsory nature of the p leb iscite , directed 
largely at s ittin g  members of parliament, appears to have originated more 
from the top levels of the organization than from the rank and f i le .  The 
majority of members were generally loyal to their local MP i f  he was doing 
a reasonably good job. For example, even though Duncan Macdonald (MLA 
Stanley) was not a particu larly  popular member of parliament, the local 
organization never nominated a candidate against him in the period under 
review. The only occasion when a grass-roots demand for a p leb iscite  
occurred in this electorate was when the seat fe ll vacant on B e ll 's  retirement 
in 1938.
The parliamentarians viewed the compulsory p leb iscite  with
apprehension and often outright h o s t ility . They shared with many in the
organization, the fear of malpractise and irreg u la rit ie s . Again, these fears
13s lig h tly  abated when rules of procedure were drawn up. However, their
greatest source of discontent was the implications of the compulsory 
p leb iscite provision upon the parliamentarians' security of tenure. Every 
three years, they faced the chance of losing party endorsement i f  another 
party member nominated, thus requiring a p leb iscite to be held.
The opposition of the parliamentary wing was most c learly
demonstrated in the selection of a candidate for the seat of Cunningham,
prior  to the 1941 state elections. The s i t t in g  Country Party member,
W.A. Deacon, refused to enrol for a plebiscite which the organization was
obliged to hold because another candidate, H. Castles, had nominated for
the seat. In protest,  Deacon announced his intention to stand as an
Independent Country Party candidate, and so central council automatically
14endorsed Castles as the o f f ic ia l  QCP candidate. What occurred next
remains unclear. However, Deacon won the election handsomely,^ and at
the next session of parliament, he remained a representative of the Q..C.P.
Alan Campbell maintains that the Country Party parliamentarians
deserted the organization to form the C.N.O. in 1941 largely because of
16their h o s t i l i t y  towards the compulsory plebiscite provision. This appears 
unlikely;  however, i t  is significant  that Campbell should have fe l t  th is.  
Obviously, he perceived great opposition to the compulsory plebiscite 
amongst the parliamentary group.
It was in this climate of h o s t i l i ty  that the compulsory 
aspect of the plebiscite was effectively displaced from the 1944 constitution. 
Clause 63 stated 'The name of a parliamentary member of the Party may at 
any time be submitted by the Central Council to the Divisional or Electorate 
Counci 1 or Branches concerned. If  the Council is requested by a Divisional 
or Electorate Council to call for further nominations, the Council may 
appoint such s i t t in g  member as the candidate unless good cause is shown to 
the Council why such member should not be appointed. The decision of the 
Council in al l  such cases shall be final and c o n c l u s i v e . ' ^  This really 
provided for the automatic endorsement of s i t t in g  members of parliament.
One assumes that many of the executive s t i l l  f e l t  that 
parliamentarians were prone to become self-centred and neglectful of their 
electors.  These attitudes were certainly s t i l l  held strongly by Alan Campbell 
and J . J .  McDonald in 1974. However, the opposition of the parliamentary group 
in the years 1936 -  1944 appears to have led the organization to adopt this
55 .
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rather more flexible attitude with regard to plebiscites. The organization 
may also have been influenced by the realization that under some circumstances 
it  was impractical and counter-productive to hold a plebiscite. The 
process consumed finance, time and energy, a ll of which were valuable 
resources in an election year. There were few safeguards in the 1936 
constitution to guard against the challenge for endorsement by a completely 
unsuitable candidate. A s it t in g  member may have enjoyed considerable 
support amongst both his electorate and the party organization. However, 
i f  another party member nominated for his seat, then a plebiscite was 
required to be held, regardless of the reputation of the s itt ing  member or 
the unpopularity or incompetence of the challenger. In such cases, the 
outcome of the plebiscite would be a foregone conclusion and the whole 
process had obviously wasted considerable time and money. Another factor 
against the compulsory plebiscite as developed in 1936 was that i f  a s itt ing  
member were required to contest a plebiscite, serious divisions could develop 
within the local organization. This would reduce the latter 's  effectiveness 
at election time. Finally, the image of both the local member of parliament 
and the party he represented would not be enhanced in the eyes of the 
electorate i f  an open challenge were made for his seat from within the 
organization itse lf.
Overall then, the hostility  of the parliamentary group 
diminished significantly with the drafting of the automatic endorsement 
provision in the 19^ constitution. Their fears were further alleviated by 
even greater streamlining of plebiscite procedures to guard against 
irregularities. The constitution now provided for an appeals committee to 
which a candidate could refer 'the conduct or result of any selection
18proceedings on the ground of unfair treatment or grave irregularity.' In
19the following years, malpractice would occasionally occur, but the rules 
established in these early years generally laid a solid framework for the 
conduct of future plebiscites.
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Another important aspect of the Q .C .P 's  se le c t ion  procedure
was the pledge. This device appears to have been copied again from the
20
A.L.P. in Queensland although Country Pa rt ie s  in other sta te s  a l s o  used i t  
at th is  time.
B a s ic a l ly ,  the pledge involved the s ig n in g  o f  a form by
candidates seeking Country Party endorsement. This form s t ip u la te d  that i f
the candidate was unsuccessfu l in h is  quest fo r  endorsement, he would
support the return o f  the candidate who was se lected. Secondly, i f  the
s ign a to ry  was endorsed and elected, he would support the platform  and po l ic y
of the party and obey i t s  c o n s t itu t io n  and ru le s.
A le s s  b ind ing  d i s c ip l in e  measure was the deposit o f 10 pounds
which a l l  candidates for  p re -se le c t ion  were required to lodge With the
organ iza t ion  before the se le c t io n  took place. The candidate fô r fe ite d  th is
deposit i f  he did not support the endorsed candidate at the e le c t ion .
A l l  A u s t ra l ia n  p o l i t i c a l  p a rt ie s  have experienced th i s  need
fo r  d i s c ip l in e  in th e ir  se le c t io n  of candidates. The Q.C.P. was no exception.
For example, on S i r  L i t t le to n  Groom's death in 1936, the federal seat of
D a r l in g  Downs was declared vacant. Central counc il conducted an exhaustive
b a l lo t  w ith in  i t s  own ranks to se le c t  a candidate. Arthur Fadden was
eventua lly  endorsed from amongst the four contestants. Following Fadden's
v ic to ry  at the ensuing b y -e le c t ion  on December 22, 1936, i t  was claimed in
centra l counc il that the three unendorsed candidates had a c t iv e ly  worked
21aga in st  the return of Fadden. One o f  the three involved was J. Cecil Roberts, 
the founder of the f i r s t  Queensland Country Party in 1915. J .J .  McDonald 
pointed out that a l l  the nominees had signed the pledge and so he recommended 
that the deposits  o f the three unendorsed candidates fo r fe ited .  However,
22
on the ca st in g  vote of the chairman, i t  was decided not to take th is  action.
A more forcefu l exe rc ise  o f  d i s c ip l in e  occurred a f te r  the period which is  
under review here. Following the 19^7 sta te  e le c t io n s ,  John Leahy, the f i r s t  
president of the Q.C.P., was expelled from the party fo r  a c t iv e ly  supporting
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the return of an unendorsed candidate, W. Low, in the Cooroora electorate.
The organization had endorsed the latter 's  cousin, David Low, who 
subsequently won the election.
In the New South Wales Country Party, the need to exercise
discipline in the preselection process was reduced by the operation of
multiple endorsement. That is, the party was prepared to endorse more
than one candidate. This concept was often discussed but never accepted by
23the Q.C.P. executive. In opposing the idea, the organization was perhaps 
strongly influenced by the voting system operating in Queensland. Multiple 
endorsement could maximize a party's vote only under a system of preferential 
voting. In 19^2, first-past-the-post voting was introduced in Queensland.
Prior to this, contingent or optional preferential voting existed. However, 
under this latter system, the majority of electors did not usually exercise 
their right to allocate preferences on the ballot sheet. I f  simple 
preferential voting had existed at the time, the organization may s t i l l  have 
been dissuaded from employing multiple endorsement through the popular claim 
that this method could sometimes divide the resources of the local organization. 
Even i f  the candidates exchanged preferences, hostility  could easily develop 
during the election campaign, harming the image of the party.
When evaluating the degree of centralization or decentralization 
in the Q.C.P.'s candidate selection procedure, one is confronted with a 
number of problems. To begin with, any value judgement on this question wi l l  
largely depend on the criteria one employs. Is centralization involved 
when nominations are called by central council rather than divisional or 
state electoral councils? Or, should this function be viewed as a routine 
matter, best performed by a central body?
A second problem is that the constitutional procedure does not 
always furnish an accurate picture of how things operate in practice. For 
example, central council may have been given the right to refuse endorsement 
of candidates, but one must seek empirical evidence to determine the extent
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to which i t  exercised this right.  F inal ly ,  during the period under review,
the lack of Country Party organization in many electorates meant that
central council was sometimes forced to play a more leading role in the
selection of candidates than under normal conditions. Thus, in 1941,
central council empowered John Leahy, E.B. Maher MLA, and W.A. Brand MLA
24to select a candidate for Port Curtis.
With these precautionary remarks in mind, one can s t i l l
detect a trend in the degree of centralization of the Q .C .P . 's  pre-selection
procedure during the years 1936 to 1944. Throughout the entire period, the
N.C.P. retained almost exclusive control over the selection of candidates
in northern electorates. After 1941, the western and south-eastern
divisions were enjoying similar powers. However, pr ior  to the emergence
of the latter  two divisions, central council had played an active role in
pre-selection. This trend of executive control and influence re-emerged
again with the dissolution of the autonomous divisions in 1944.
From the beginning, central council was given the right to
25endorse or refuse to endorse any candidate. It would usually endorse
nominations before the pre-selection, and then i t  would endorse the candidate
after the recommendation from the state electorate council .  This was by no
means a routine formality.  As already mentioned, the member for Cunningham,
W.A. Deacon, was denied endorsement in 1941. Central council closely scrutinized
the qualifications of those nominees who submitted for the Maranoa plebiscite
in 1940. It deferred endorsement of certain nominees until  they submitted
26proof of their  financial membership.
Despite the 'compulsory plebiscite* provision, central council
approval was needed before a plebiscite could be conducted. This power was
jus t if ie d  on the basis that many electorates were unorganized. However, in
1937, the Stanley electorate council was refused the right  to hold a plebiscite
even though i t  had a membership of approximately 1000. This decision evoked
27considerable grass-roots opposition, and central council f in a l ly  retracted.
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At the same time, the West Moreton electorate council had been refused 
the right to conduct a plebiscite when a member nominated against Maher.
28The electorate council protested, but this time central council stood firm.
Whenever approval was granted to hold a plebiscite, central 
council decided the dates on which the rolls and nominations closed, when 
the ballot would be conducted, and what qualifications were required by 
nomi nees.
Selection of candidates for the Senate was undertaken solely 
by central council, the N.C.P. claimed it had been forced to d isa ff i l ia te  
in 19^3 because the executive's Senate selection had not included a northern 
representative. Central council also decided which electorates would be 
contested at election time.
In 19^, the new constitution gave formal recognition to many
of the powers which central council had enjoyed in the pre-selection process
in previous years. The constitution also increased these powers. The
'automatic endorsement' provision could presumably be used by central council
to counter a grass-roots movement to remove a s it t ing  member. Clause 66
stipulated that 'Where, by reason of a sudden dissolution of Parliament or 
29any other exigency i t  is not practicable for a plebiscite to be held, the
Central Council may, after consultation with the Divisional or Electorate
30Council or Branches concerned, choose and endorse a candidate.1
What was the rank and f i le  reaction to this gradual 
centralization by the executive of the pre-selection process? The mass 
membership did not generally object or care about the strong powers which the 
executive exercised in other areas. However, executive control over candidate 
selection sometimes met with considerable opposition, even from the usually 
passive members. For the latter, the selection of a candidate was the one 
function in which they could play a meaningful role. These attitudes were 
particularly strong in party held seats. Elsewhere, jealousy of local 
prerogatives was far less developed. It  has already been mentioned how the
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Stanley Electorate Council demanded the right to hold a plebiscite  in 1937
after R.M. Bell had announced he would retire. The executive f in a l ly  agreed
to the demands when the electorate council threatened to withdraw completely 
31from the Q.C.P. The minutes of the Maleny branch display consistent
opposition to central council powers in the area of candidate selection.
It  even passed a resolution opposing the executive's ultimate power of 
32endorsement.
To conclude, in the years 1936 to 19^, the Q.C.P. developed 
a pre-selection procedure which laid great emphasis on the plebiscite  and 
the pledge. The compulsory plebiscite, aimed largely at s i t t in g  members of 
parliament, gradually disappeared under the weight of opposition. In 19^4, 
provisions for automatic endorsement were written into the new constitution. 
These years also saw a gradual centralization of the pre-selection procedure, 
a process which was viewed with misgivings by many of the usually passive 
rank and f i l e.
These trends continued after 19^. The plebiscite  and the 
pledge remained an integral part of the pre-selection procedure for many 
years. Executive powers in the area of candidate selection increased s t i l l  
further. At the same time, opposition to these powers from the rank and 
f i l e  did not abate. To this day, a satisfactory solution has not been reached 
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CHAPTER IO
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY WING
During the period 1936 to 1944, considerable conflict occurred between 
the Q.C.P. organization and the parliamentary wing. This conflict arose 
from the efforts of both sides to assert their prerogatives and indepen­
dence within the new party. In the last chapter, it was seen that the 
compulsory plebiscite was a central issue in this struggle. The ex­
ecutive was also irritated by the apathetic and sometimes hostile 
approach of many parliamentarians towards organizing. The two wings 
of the party responded differently to the amalgamation overtures by 
the U.A.P. The most disruptive action was of course the parliament­
arians1 desertion of the organization in 1941 when together with the 
U.A.P., they formed the Country-National Organization.
Before examining this conflict in detail, one should 
make a closer examination of the protagonists involved. When using the 
term, parliamentary wing, it is not meant to suggest that all parlia­
mentarians displayed the same degree of hostility towards the organization. 
For example, W.A. Brand (M.L.A. Isis) refused to join the C.N.O. in 
1941. Campbell claims that Adermann (M.H.R. Maranoa) was a consistent 
supporter of the organization.* Of course, he was a foundation mem­
ber of central council and did not gain a seat in parliament until 
1943. Those who were suspicious of the parliamentarians and who 
felt a real need to control them generally came from the executive 
and the upper echelons of the organization. The vast majority of the 
rank and file members did not play a significant role in the disputes 
that occurred. They were usually loyal to their local member of 
parliament. At the same time, they usually accepted decisions taken 
by the executive on their behalf.
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Prior to the formation of the C.N.O., the opposition of 
the politicians to organizing in their electorates was, along with the 
compulsory plebiscite issue, one of the major sources of friction between 
the two wings of the party. Referring to the twelve members of parl­
iament who joined the Q.C.P. on May 22, 1936, Campbell wrote, 'Few of 
those members in later years, ever helped the organization and some re­
sisted establishment of organization in their electorates. Their plea
2was that they could win seats with their own personality1. In 1937,
McDonald threatened that unless the parliamentary party 'pulled its
weight' and helped form branches in their own electorates, the N.C.P.
3
would cease co-operating with the southern body. During a recent
interview, McDonald related how J.B. Edwards (M.L.A. Nanango) and
E.H.C. Clayton (M.L.A. Wide Bay) were particularly hostile to oganiz-
ation in their electorates. He claimed that Edwards openly boycotted
A
a meeting at Kingaroy. As a result, only two people attended. Sir 
Charles Adermann confirmed that Edwards was often opposed to organiz­
ation.“* Prior to the 1938 elections, the honorary secretary of the 
Q.C.P., J.A. Austin, strongly urged all parliamentarians to take a 
greater interest in organizing electorates. He even suggested that 
'sitting Country Party members who fail to assist in this work should 
not be endorsed'.^
Another important area of disagreement between the organiz­
ation and the parliamentary wing was the question of non-labor unity. 
Having emerged from an anti-labor entity in 1936, the parliamentarians 
displayed a consistent desire to return into such a relationship. In 
May 1939, Hunter upbraided Maher for claiming that 'the Country Party 
had failed'.^ In that same year, the parliamentary party unanimously 
recommended that 'serious consideration be given to meeting the U.A.P.
g
to discover the basis for greater cohesion and agreement1. Annual
q
conference strongly rebuffed the suggestion. In 1940, the parliamen­
tary party again differed with the organization following a merger 
proposal by the U.A.P.*^
On April 27, 19 4 1, a complete rift took place between 
the organization and the parliamentary wing. On that day, the leader 
of the federal Country Party, Arthur Fadden, convened a secret meeting 
of all anti-labor members of parliament in Queensland. From this 
meeting emerged a new political party, the Country National Organiz­
ation (C.N.O.). As mentioned in chapter 2, this new force was justified 
as a war-time measure, an initial step towards an all-party national 
government.
For many of the organizational leaders, this sudden 
desertion of the parliamentary wing merely re-enforced a pre-existing 
scepticism of the politicians' loyalty to the Q.C.P. It was denied 
that the C.N.O. had been established to foster the development of an 
all-party national government. On June 26, 1941, Leahy wrote to the pres­
ident of the C.N.O., Sir Fergus McMaster, 'My executive is convinced 
that the real objective was not in any way associated with National 
Unity, but rather the influence of outside interests to scuttle the 
Country P a r t y ' . I t  was claimed that if the founders of the C.N.O. 
had been sincerely interested in national unity, then the A.L.P. should 
have been invited to participate in the realignment of political forces.
The C.N.O.'s anti-labor composition was contrasted with the all-party
12government operating in Great Britain at the time.
It was widely believed in the t<i>p levels of the Q.C.P. 
organization that Fadden had formed the C.N.O. in pursuit of his goal 
to eventually become Prime Minister, leading an Austral ia’-v/ide anti- 
1abor party.*^
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The parliamentary wing was never actually  expelled from 
the Q.C.P. for its  actions. However, as time went by, the re lation ­
ship between the two bodies rapidly deteriorated. Extremely b itte r 
words were exchanged between John Leahy and S ir  Fergus McMaster.
When, in 1943» McMaster f in a lly  suggested that the two organizations
should hold a jo in t conference 'in  an effo rt to present a united
\ kfront at the federal e l e c t i o n s L e a h y ' s pubiic reply was far 
from friendly - 'he [McMaster] denounces me as the arch-villa in  of 
the p o litica l drama....We shall attend that conference i f  for no 
other reason than to make a personal explanation'. Leahy's out­
spoken attacks upon the pariiamentarians during these years earned 
him few friends from amongst this group. It  was in order to effect
the return of the parliamentary wing that Leahy agreed to resign
16from the presidency on October 22, 19^3. S ir  Frank N ick lin , who 
was the parliamentary leader of the C.N.O., insists that i f  Leahy 
had not resigned, the majority of the parliamentarians would 
never have returned to the Q .C .P .^
The above account reveals the extent to which the parl­
iamentary wing wished to influence the nature and goals of the 
organization. It  must be remembered that the parliamentarians had 
experienced membership within a united non-labor party (the C.P.N.P.) 
for eleven years before the Q.C.P. was f in a lly  established. One 
suspects that many of these members may have joined the ranks of the
Q.C.P. in 1936 less out of loyalty to the new organization than out
18of a desire to rid themselves of the Moore stigma. Ever since the 
la tte r gentleman's unpopular administration during the Depression, 
the C.P.N.P. had a very poor public image and it  electoral prospects 
were low.
The extra-parliamentary wing of the C.P.N.P. was not 
strong and it  did not seek to exercise d iscip line over members of
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parliament. There existed very little organization in rural elec­
torates. Instead, members relied heavily upon their own personal 
appeal to retain their seats. Having operated within this envir­
onment for over a decade, it is not surprising that the parliamen­
tarians viewed with alarm some of the ideas of the Q.C.P. organiz­
ation. The compulsory plebiscite was something new and threatening. 
Similarly, party organization was seen as a threat to the politician's 
security of tenure and freedom of action. Local organization could 
easily become a rival focus of power in opposition to the member's 
loosely structured personal following. The parliamentary wing also 
appeared to dislike the very concept of a permanent extra-plarlia- 
mentary organization. This resentment arose from the fact that the 
organization was so distinct from the parliamentary party and the 
latter was formally responsible to it for its conduct. Even if in 
practice this organization did not exercise great control over the 
parliamentary wing, the actual existence of this imposing body was 
perhaps felt by the members of parliament to be an affront to their 
integrity and stewardship.
Meanwhile, many in the organization felt even more strongly 
that the parliamentary wing needed to be checked and controlled. One 
of the most outstanding features of the organizational leaders during 
this period was the extent to which they perceived politicians as 
lazy opportunists who felt they had a 'divine right' to their seats.
In chapter 9, it was seen that Campbell and McDonald voiced these 
sentiments particularly strongly. However, their extreme views were 
equalled and perhaps surpassed by those of John Leahy. Even before 
Leahy's angry outbursts against the C.N.O., he had not been popular 
with the parliamentary wing. He possessed a forthright and sometimes 
over-bearing manner which was enhanced by his own physically imposing
68.
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figure and deep, sincere voice. He would often frame his suggestions
or advice to the parliamentary wing in terms of orders or directions. J
This mistrust of the politicians was evident even at the
Q.C.P.'s foundation in 1936. The convenors of the first Country
Party conference in March of that year did not wish to invite the
rural members of parliament lest the latter gain control of the 
20proceedings. Eventually, Maher received an invitation the day
21 11before the conference began. He and A.G. Muller (M.L.A. Fassifern)
22then attended as observers.
Duverger has drawn the distinction between parties of
parliamentary or electoral origins and parties created from outside
23the parliamentary group. The latter type, of which the Q.C.P. is 
obviously an example, usually display 'more or less open mistrust 
of the parliamentary group, and a more or less definite desire to
2ksubject it to the authority of an independent controlling committee'. 
The formation and general development of the Q.C.P.
organization were clearly conceived by many of its leaders as a 
means of controlling and overseering the parliamentary wing. In 
pursuit of this goal, specific devices were built into the structure 
of the organization. The most important of these measures were the 
compulsory plebiscite and the pledge. In addition, there was a con­
scious desire amongst the framers of the 1936 constitution to restrict
25the number of parliamentarians within the Q.C.P. executive. The 
constitution eventually stipulated that the federal and state parl­
iamentary parties were entitled to only two and three delegates
26respectively on central council. The western division's const it- 
ution specified that 'the parliamentary representative of any area 
within the jurisdiction of the Western Divisional Council shall on
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request of the Secretary of that council advise him of matters brought
before the House and shall foreward them a copy of all Bills relating 
27
to such matters'. It is interesting to note that prior to both the 
1
1938 and 19bf state elections, central council established a committee
28to take part in the drawing up of Maher's policy speech.
The era of the C.N.O. constituted a climax to the conflict 
between the organization and the parliamentary wing. After 19^3, a 
gradual reconciliation began to take place. Each side had grown to 
respect the resources held by the other in any kind of struggle. The 
politicians may have returned to the Q.C.P. in 19^3 largely because 
they feared the organization's ability to endorse and return Country 
Party candidates in their electorates at the 19^ state elections.
At the same time, the circumstances in which the parlia­
mentary wing returned suggest that the organization had grown to 
appreciate the need for the co-operation of the former group if 
the party was to be successful. Although machinery was set in motion 
to endorse a candidate against Fedden for the 19^3 federal elections, 
this action was halted. The Q.C.P. perhaps realized that it would 
have been the real sufferer if it had carried out its threat. Ref­
erring to the various powers enjoyed by parliamentary leaders over 
party organization, Michels has written 'The dismissal by the organiz­
ed masses of a universally esteemed leader would discredit the party
29throughout the country'.
The need for reconciliation is evident in the lack of 
disciplinary action taken against the parliamentarians when they 
rejoined the Q.C.P. Furthermore, the unpopular Leahy was obliged to 
resign from the presidency. The parliamentary leaders of the re­
united Q.C.P. were elected on March 4, 19^3» Nicki in, Duncan Mac­
donald, and J.B. Edwards were elected leader, secretary and whip in
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30that order. All had held the same positions in the C.N.O. Finally,
the effective removal of the compulsory plebiscite and the introduction
of the automatic endorsement provision in I9^> must also be seen as
part of this reconciliation process.
The conflict that occurred between the organization and
the parliamentary wing between 1936 and 19^4, was, in many ways, a
natural process as both sides tried to establish their rights and
powers as well as an image of authority within the new structure.
After 1944, the party would never again experience the
same degree of disharmony between the two bodies. The parliamentary
wing now accepted that the organization was the back-bone and final
arbiter over the life of the party. At the same time, the desertion
of the parliamentarians in 1941, had taught the organizational leaders
that their parliamentary colleagues could not be treated too roughly, 
s
They were indispenpible to the party's survival and success. Any
political party is largely evaluated by outsiders on the activities
of its parliamentary wing. They constitute 'the main bearers of
the party's traditions, values and mores, both to the party members
31
and the electorate'.
However, the physical and psychological gap between the 
organization and the parliamentary wing would remain. Whenever an 
issue arose which found the two bodies disagreeing with each other, 
the organization would be quite prepared to use the resources it 
had developed in the years 1936-1944 in order to influence the 
political wing. The extent to which these resources would be 
brought into operation and the extent of success achieved would of 
course largely depend upon the personality of those occupying the 
executive positions. Leahy's successor, Alan Campbell, was quite
prepared to utilize the available powers to occasionally check the 
pari iamentarians.
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By 1944, the Country Party in Queensland had developed a 
distinctive pattern of organizational structure and behaviour. This 
pattern included a preoccupation with survival, a pyramidal structure 
headed by a strong executive, regionalist sentiments within the northern 
division, the development of a mass membership, frustrated efforts to 
achieve complete financial autonomy, a centralized pre-selection procedure 
based largely on the plebiscite and the pledge, and the des ire by the 
organization to be considered as the final authority over the party, (if 
only in an emotional and general sense).
It is now intended to briefly describe how this pattern would 
continue after those formative years 1936-1944. With regard to survival, 
between 1945 and 1963, the organization unanimously and publicly rejected 
a total of six merger offers from its non-labor ally.^ When the Country 
Party finally gained political office in 1957, the organization took great 
care to ensure that the coalition arrangement did not jeopardize the party's 
independence in any way. A new element has since been added to the 
question of survival when, in 1974, the party changed its name to the 
National Party of Australia (N.P.A.) in an effort to lose its purely rural 
identity and to capture provincial and even metropolitan seats.
Within the organization, the powers of the executive (central 
council and management committee) would grow even stronger after 1944 - a 
trend which wouldnot really disturb the rank and file. The party's limited 
objectives and social homogeneity have meant that members are usually 
quite content for the executive to take action on their behalf. The 
extent to which the executive would be prepared to utilize its available 
powers would of course largely depend on the personality of those holding 
the top positions.
Despite the growth of executive powers, the northern division
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would for many years s t i l l  enjoy considerable independence from southern
control -  a phenomenon which is traceable to the continued potency of
regionalism in north Queensland. The division possessed its own headquarters
in Cairns, and i t  maintained its own membership records. Control over
candidate selection largely reverted to the executive; however, the
northern division s t i l l  enjoyed greater freedom in this party a c t iv i ty
than did other regional bodies within the organization. I t  was mentioned
in chapter 8 that Country Party members in the north favoured non-labor
unity more than their southern counterparts. This feature became evident
in 1956 with the founding of the North Queensland Co-ordinating Committee,
a body which was meant to foster greater cohesion between the Country
2
Party and Liberal Party in the north.
The western and south-eastern divisions were maintained as 
t e r r i to r ia l  units of the organization after 1 9 ^ ;  however, al l  their 
important powers reverted to central council.  In 1950, these divisions 
disappeared altogether.
After 19^^, the organization accelerated the campaign to
develop a mass party based on direct membership. Under the influence of
the new president, Alan Campbell, the membership fee was raised to one 
3
pound one s h i l l in g  and the bank order system was introduced throughout the
organization. Head office took over from the divisions the control of
field organizers. The party appointed Colonel N.G. Hatton as its organizing
secretary. Under Hatton's expert guidance and with the assistance of
his numerous personal contacts throughout rural Queensland, a team of paid
organizers now set about achieving Campbell's goal of enrolling by bank
if
order 1,000 members in every rural electorate. Dramatic increases in 
membership were in fact accomplished throughout the state. In 19^8, the 
records at head office (which excluded the figures held by the northern 
division) indicated a partymembership of 21,897* Membership in the central 
division was 2,695; the south-eastern division,  7,^56; and the western
77 .
division, 11,698.^ When Campbell retired from the presidency in 1951,
he claimed to have enrolled approximately 35,000 members throughout
£
the state. Since then, membership has steadily fallen off .  The decline 
was i n i t i a l l y  due to the extreme h o s t i l i ty  of many graziers towards the 
Fadden-inspired Wool Sales Deduction Act of 1950. An important departure 
from the years prior to 1 9 ^  was the development of a large and active 
womens' section,^ as well as an organization for junior members. The goal 
of financial independence remained prominent in the Country Party 
organization. As thousands of new members were enrolled after 1 9 ^ ,  the 
financial position naturally improved. The membership fee was relatively  
high (one pound one s h i l l in g )  and most subscriptions were made through the 
bank order system. However, with the fall  in membership after 1951, the 
organization was beset by the same financial d i f f ic u l t ie s  i t  had experienced 
prior  to 1 9 ^ .  Campbell blamed the apathy of the executive for both the 
decline in membership and the worsening of the financial position after 
I95I.  F inal ly ,  in 1968, the former president resigned from all  executive 
positions (state and federal trustee) in the organization. He took this 
action in protest against a central council proposal to draw funds from 
the trustee account in order to cover the party's administrative debts. 
Central council also proposed raising the membership fee. Campbell insisted 
that the proper way to increase the income from the party's ranks was to 
enrol more members.^
The plebiscite and the pledge remained an integral part of 
the Country Party's pre-selection procedure for many years after 1 9 ^ .  
However, the cost and time involved in conducting a plebiscite has resulted 
in the greater u t i l iza t io n  of various forms of selection committees in 
recent times. The whole pre-selection procedure became even more centralized 
under the control of the executive. The present constitution of the 
party stipulates that 'Provided that i f  Central Council considers at any 
time that the interests of the Party wi l l  be best served by selection i t
7 8 .
may resolve by a majority of at least two-thirds of those present -
(a) That it  will select the candidate, or
Q
(b) that it w ill depute the selection to a Selection Committee1
The executive's insistence on playing a leading role in 
the selection of candidates continued to provide, in party held electorates, 
one of the very few sources of friction between the top and lower levels of 
the organization.
After the relationship between the organization and
the parliamentary wing was usually harmonious. The clashes that had 
occurred in earlier years can be largely attributed to 'growing pains' as 
both sides tried to flex their muscles within the nascent party. In later 
years, the organization did not seek to exercise specific or total control 
over the parliamentary wing. It did not usually see its functions as one 
of directing the parliamentary wing on party policy. The concensus 
surrounding the party's programme and the homogeneity of the party's 
support largely precluded the need for this type of control. However, it  
sought to be respected as the ultimate overseer of the party's destiny.
It saw its role as ensuring that the parliamentary party acted as a 
cohesive whole in parliament and effectively championed the cause of their 
party and electorate.
The extent to which the organization was prepared to 
utilize its moral and physical resources in any dispute or confrontation 
with the parliamentary wing would yet again depend upon the temperament 
and disposition of the office holders. As mentioned in chapter 10, Alan 
Campbell was certainly prepared to utilize  these powers. In 1951, he was 
responsible for withdrawing endorsement from Charles Russell (MHR Maranoa) 
after the latter had broken party policy on the currency appreciation 
issue. In another one of the party's rare policy disputes, this time on 
the question of freeholding, Campbell became involved in heated debates 
with Nicki in and Sir Alan Fletcher (MLA Cunningham).^
7 9 .
The assumption of office by the party in 1957 injected
a new element into the relationship between the organization and the
parliamentary wing. The attraction of political office is such that
when a party gains power, it will be far more reluctant to become involved
s
in internal dissension, thus harming the party's image and electoral 
support.
The success of a party organization can be measured by both 
its electoral gains and the degree of solidarity within the organization. 
Electorally, the Country Party organization has not achieved a great deal.
At the 1938 state elections, the party gained 22.64% of the total valid 
vote. Thirty years later, at the 1969 state elections, the party gained 
only 17.03% of the total vote.^ The success of the Country Party 
organization is seen far more in the second factor - the extent of cohesion 
within the organization and the unity of purpose between it and the 
parliamentary wing.
One feels that Aitkin's comments on the post-war Country
Party in New South Wales are equally relevant here: 'The party could
have evolved after the war as little more than a cluster of powerful local
d
Members living on p^st capital. However, it has been the function of Central
Council and Executive, of Head Office, and the field staff, to keep the
idea of "party" alive, to maintain the identity of the party, and to create
12a sense of party continuity.'
To conclude, by 1944, definite trends in structure and 
behaviour had emerged within the Country Party organization. These trends 
would be amended and changed in the following years by such factors as new 
environmental circumstances and the personality of different party leaders. 
However, the general conduct of both the organization and the party as a 
whole would in many respects be determined by the framework that developed 
between the years 1936 to 1944.
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